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October 10, 1984 
STATEMENT Of DR. DAVID W. HAFEMEISTER 
Subcomlllittee on Energy Development and Appl ications. and 
Subco~mjttee on Energy Research and Production, 
CO~Mittee on Science end TeChnology 
House of Representatives 
REGUAROING THE NEED TO CONVERT DOMESTIC RESEARCH REACTORS
 
FROM HIGHLY ENRICHED TO lOW-ENRICHED URNAIUM FUELS
 
BIOGRAPHY BRIEF 
I all Il. PrOfessor of Physics lit the ellt ifOl"'nill. Polytechnic 
Universify. My curriculum vitae is lIttllched. Froll 1962 to 1966, I 
used research reactors at the University of Illinois end at the los 
Ale~os Scientific laboratory to carry out experillonts in nuclear and 
sol id stete physics. Froll 1975 to 1977, I was Science Advisor to 
Senator John Glenn, who was the Ad-Hoc Ch~ir~~n of the Governmental 
Affeirs Committee on Nonprol ifer~tion Iletters. Frail 1977-79 I llIes 
Speciel Assist~nt ~nd Expert Consult~nt to Under Secret~ry of St~te 
Lucy Benson and Deputy Under Secretary Joseph Nye, working prill~rily 
on nonprol iferation Ilatters. Among other responsibi I ities, I llIas the 
lead State Departllent deleg~te to Working Group 8 (Advanced Fuel Cycle 
~nd Reactor Concepts) of the International Fuel CyCle Evaluation 
(INFCE) llIhich .as held ~t the Internaional Ato~ie Energy Agency (IAEA) 
in Vienna. SUbgroup C of this Working Group had as its sale task the 
assessment of methods of reducing prol iferation risks associated with 
research reactors. I also .as a lIellber of the interagency Subgroup on 
Nuclear Exports (SNEC). 
CONCLUS ION 
It is my opinion that research reactors in the U.S. should be 
required to convert from high-enriched uraniUIl fuels (HEU) to 
low-enriched uranium fuels (lEU). The 101ller flux reactors can convert 
to the' presently available uraniurn-lliuminum fuels. end the higher flux 
reactors een convert to the uranium-silicon fuels llIhieh .ill be 
aveileble in a te. years. Exceptions to this conversion should be 
ellollled only upon e finding that the nelll fuers 1lI0uid not be feesible. 
This conclusion is besed on (1) requirements for adequate physical 
security, (2) consistency with the national pol icy on 
nonproliferation. and (3) technical evailability of the ne. lEU tuels. 
If the NRC's proposed rule requiring conversion to non-llIeapons grade 
fuel does not go torlllard as plenned, which I think llIould be a IIi stake, 
and HEU remeined at these reactors, security 1lI0uid have to be strictly 
increaseO. The strictly increased security lIould be far more 
expensive than conversion, it would be academically intrusive, and it 
1lI0uid be far Jess effective in reOucing risks of theft of 
weapons-usable lIaterial. Failure to go forlll~rd .ith domestic 
conversion 1lI0uid throlll ~ Inajor obstical in the way of our long 
standing toreign pol icy goal of conversion of foreign reactors anO 
reduction in the international comllerce of HEU. 
WEAPONS IMPLICATIONS 
There is general agree~en~ that highly-enriched uroniu. is 
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dangerous in that n~clear weapons can be fabricated tro~ this 
.ateriel. The proliferation risk associated with HEU is that it can 
be used directly to ~ake nuclear weapons, unlike the row-enriched 
uranium used, for example, in power reactors. No further enrichment, 
generally very costly end difficult, would be necessary in order 
utilize the materiel in a clandes'tine fission explosive, thus .. eking 
it a potential I, attractive terget for theft or diversion. FOr this 
and related reasons, it has been the pol icy, both nationally end 
inter-nationlly, to attempt to minimze the 1l1ll0unt of HEU in use. 
The A~eric8n Nuclear Society acknowledges this problem. In a 
recent study (C. Sterr, Science 224,952 (1984», the Americ~n Nucle~r 
SOCiety stated that: 
"There are now about 350 research reactors in ebout 50 
countries, of which 25 ere developing countries. Many of 
these reectors ere too small to produce signficant amounts 
of plutoniu... However, most of thell heve been suppl ied with 
highly enriched urenium fuel, which. in principle, might be 
accu~ulated to ~ake e single nuclear device. This 
possibl ity is now being precluded by conversion to lower 
enrichment (less than 20 percent) designs." 
HfU wEAPONS 
Since HEU cen be used directly to fashion a clandestine fission 
explosive by either a state or a terrorist group, the use of HEU 
should be Ilinimized, end when HEU is used it must be under edeque1e 
physicel security. LEU is considerebly less effective as a nucleer 
explosion since (1) it requires ebout 15 times more LEU uranium then 
HEU urenium (with reflectors), (2) ebout 3 times more U-235, and (3) 
it is much more difficult to develOp end del iver e nuclear weepon that 
cons i sts of hundreds of k i lograms of UrlHl i UII. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIYE 
The I nd i en dev ice of 191'4 hi ghtened concerns in the U. S., the 
Congress, end the Executive Branch. Shortly efter this event, ebout 
one-half dozen contracts were signed 10 export enrichllent and 
reprocessing plents to SNal ler netions, Ileny of which did not have an 
econollic need for such feci I ities. In response to these events, the 
Congress cOllmissioned e study by the Office of Technology Assessllent. 
The OTA report (1977) eckno.ledged thet solutions to nuclear 
nonprol iteration are not simple by stating that: 
"11 is not too Jete to contein prol iferation et a level 
which ctln be assimileted by the internetionat pol itical 
system. However, there ere no single or till-purpose 
solutions; no short-cuts. A vieble nonprol iferation pol icy 
wilt require the coordinated, pli!lnned use of e wide veriety 
of rnei!lsures." 
THE RESPONSE OF THE CONGRESS 
The U.S. Congress (essentially unani_ouslyl respoflded to this 
situ~tion by p~ssing the Nucle~r Nonprol iteration Act of 1978 (NNPAl 
~nd the Glenn-Syllington A~end~ent. As 8 r8sult ot these and other 
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llctions. the U.S. pol icy is to 1II011'IlZ8 the use of HEU in the world. 
The U.S. governl'lent has not exported HEU for lo.er-flux reactors, and 
it hilS esked for conversion to higher density fuels in the future for 
higher-flux reactors. This progrlll'l. known liS the Reduced-Enrichment 
Research and Test Reactor FrogI'llI'! (RERTRl. represents the offielel 
policy of the United States aimed at llttel'lpting to reduce enrichl'lents 
of research reactor fuelS and thus the III'1Qunt of HEU in use. 
INTERHATIONAL RESPONSE 
The surnmary report of the Internlltionlll Nuclellr Fuel Cycte 
EVlllulltion (1980l hes stated that it Is feasible to markedly reduce 
the uranium enrich ... ent of II greet mllJority of resellrch rellctors: 
INFeE endorsed the conversion of HEU fueled rese~rch reactors to lower 
enrichment. 
HEU EXPORT LICENSES 
The U.S. no longer will accept new commitments to e",port HEU for 
foreign research reactors. New research reactors are being sold only 
with LEU fuels. A few commitl1ents for HEU for high-flu", research 
reactors ere being carried out on en interim basiS to Belgiul1, France, 
Holl and and Japan, but, we have asked them to convert to LEU. end, as 
I understand it, they have agreed to do so. Recently. the U.S. did 
exporf 0.9 kg of HEU to the Canadien-built SLOW POKE reactor in 
Jamaica, but the Canadians have stated they wi II not request eny more 
HEU for their research reactors. 
HEU AND THE APPLICATION OF THE GLENN-SYMINGTON AMENDMENT 
This a.endmont denies mil itarv and economic aid to those 
non-nuclear weapons states that (a) explode a nuclear device. or (b) 
build enrichment and reprocessing facilities outside of an 
international framework. On April 6, 1979, this sanction was applied 
to Pakistan since it was concluded that Pakistan was building en 
enrichment plant to produce weapons-grade uranium. This sanction was 
later removed because of the Soviet invasion of Afganistan. I was 
intimately involved with this a_endm8nt while working with Senator 
Glenn (joining him in the House-Senate Conference where the House 
accepted the Senate language), and while working in the State 
Department (debating its merits before the Deputy Secretary of State, 
at OMB meetings, writing testimony, etc.) This amendment was adopted 
without dissent in the Congress. The Congress was, and is. concerned 
about HEU. 
HEU IN THE IRAQI REACTOR 
This HEU-fueled research reactor was destroyed b'l Israel in 1981­
France no longer wil I export HEU to lr~q, but they .ill export LEU to 
Iraq. 
CONSISTENCY IN FOREIGN POLICY 
The professionel staffs concerned .ith nonprol iferation Ia~tters 
are convinced that It would be helpful to convert U.S. research 
reactors in order to be consistent with the French, C~nedian, end 
A~erican positions. lnteregency ~eetlngs at DMB ~ight try to soften 
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this position. but I know of no serious noopral iferation staff member 
who would disagree ~jth the conversion requjre~ent. As we have seen 
from the eXlll'llples of Pakisten find Iraq, noopra! iteration ceo be 
compromised by other foreign pol icy concerns. It is true thllt the 
carry ing out of II sllnction llIgllinst one nation. mey wei J cost us in our 
diplomatic standing with that nation, end that larger events (such as 
the Soviet invllsion of Atgllnistlln) can push nooprol iferlltion pol icy 
the other way, towards ignoring the problem. The beauty of the HEU 
conversion proposal is thet. for at IIOst S15 III; II ion. the U. S. CliO 
achieve consistency between whet we demand of others llInd what we 
clelland of oursel ves. r have found out frol1 personal experience when 
deal ing with nuclear officials of other nations that "moral 
leadership" quite often does not work in foreign pol icy, but most of 
us would agree that being inconsistent by favoring our university 
reactors with HEU wil I certainly make the pol itical cl imate abroad for 
the HEU to LEU conversions all the 1Il0re difficult. In the area of 
nonproliferation policy, the $15 million figure is relatively minor, 
as compared to other costs in this area. 
INTERNATIONAL RAMifiCATIONS If THE DOMESTIC RULE IS REVERSED 
Domestic HEU conversion would be consistent with U.S. policy of 
protecting against the very worrisoille prospect of large quantities of 
HEU without adequate safeguards. failure to take this precaution in 
the U.S. would damage U.S. foreign pol icy interests by undercutting 
our government's attempts to reduce international co~merce in HEU and 
convince other nations of the need to reduce their HEU holoings. I 
know frail personal experience in representing the State Department in 
interections with nuclear officials frolll other countries that it will 
be much more difficult for the U.S. to succeed in its pol icy of 
reduced enrichments and HEU holdings abroad if the pol icy is not 
vigoriously pursed lit home. This inconsistency would not be lost on 
the nations we are trying to influence. 
PHYSICAL SECURITY 
It should be stilted that it is both national and international 
pol icy that kilogram quantities of HEU IIUst be safeguarded. While 
tillloly warning, after the fact. of theft or diversion is a key element 
in such safeguards, post-loss reporting is not sufficient protection 
and fails to minimize the possibriites for unauthorized removal os 
such material. The removal of ki logram quaniTies of 93% enriched 
U-235 would have extraordinarily serious potential consequences. 
Section 10 CfR 73.67(a)(1) st~tes that 
"EaCh licensee ••• shall establish and maintain ~ physical 
proctection systelll that will achieve the fallowing 
Objectives: 
I i) Minimize the possibil ites for unauthorized removal of 
special nuclear materiel consistent with the potential 
consequences of such actions: and 
Iii) Facilitate the location and I"'ecovery of missing speci~1 
nucleer material." 
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First of all, I would like to l!Iddress the word ·consequences" in (i). 
The consequences of obtaining HEU could be the development of e 
nucleer device which could destabilize our internlltioneJ trenne_ork of 
nations. This extremely serious event lIight kil t thousands of people 
end could be II precursor to lin internlltionel conflict. Next I would 
like to address the word ·consistent· in (i). To nini~ize the 
possibiliites of unauthorized rellovlli in II wily which is.consistent 
.ith the seriousness of the potential consequences of such II removel 
mellns that very stringent physical security lind recovery techniques 
lIlust be llVllilllble. The (hypothetical) intrusion must be 
site-specific. Is the facit it, really secure7 The time line of 
possible recovery must be considered. How long would it take for a 
recovery team to arrive7 Would the signal be triggered by the 
penetration into the building, and would there be time delays before 
the penetration of the secondary barriers7 From where would recovery 
team come? Would the detection devices be appl icable for fuel that 
was not very radioactive? How far can a vehicle travel during this 
time to get away with the fuel? What is scan rate of the aircraft? 
If it is 70 square kilometers per hour, then this would imply a radius 
of 4.7 km (3 miles). The ~inimum velocity of the escape vehicle would 
have to be 
V (MPH) "' 3/T 
where T is the arrival time in hours of the ~onitorin9 aircraft after 
the first signal. If it took one hour after detecting the first 
signal of the violation to obtain a scanning aircraft above the 
reactor, the minimu~ velocity of the vehicle would be 3 MPH. ~ 
difficult to i~a ine an vehicle being slo. enough to get caught under 
this circu~s ances. n a or .or s, one canna c I WI 
poS'FTTitlTf detect.on since the fuel would be gone. 
RADIATION BARRIER 
As , understand it. the radiation level of a bundle of fuel froll 
a typicel 100 kif reactor would drop to only about 10 REM/hour 
(unshielded at 3 feetl in about 7 days after shutdown. Since this 
level .ould not deter theft, it would be necessary to protect the HEU 
with strict physical security meesures. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Research reactors in the U.S. should be required to convert from 
HEU to LEU. The lower-flux reactors should do this within the noar 
term, end the higher~tlux reactors should convert to lEU when the U-Si 
fuels are evailable. Exceptions should be permitted only for the very 
rare case .here it can be shown that this conversion is infeasible. 
If the reactors are not converted to lEU, then the reactors should be 
operated so that the fuel bundles .ill have strict physical security 
to protect the~. Our long standing eftorts to reduce HEU .ould be 
severely da~aged if the proposed rule did not go int? effect. 
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David V. ~~fe~ei$ter 
ProfessiorAl ~1f!catlons 
1.	 ~ucatlon: 
a.	 Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering fro~
 
~orthwestern University, 1957
 
b.	 M3. and Ph.D. in Physics. University of Illinois, 1959. 1964 
c.	 Post-Doctoral Fello~shlpsl
 
Los Alamos Scientific laboratory (~964.66)
 
American Association for the Advancement of Science
 
Congressional Fe11o~5hl~ (1975-1976) 
2,	 Emplo;nnent 
a.	 MechaniCAl ~lneer. Argonne National L&b (1957-,58) 
b.	 Physicist. Los Alamos 3cientific Labc~tory (19~~6E) 
c.	 Assistant Professor of Physics, ~~egle-r.ellow Cniversity (1966-6?; 
d.	 Associate Professor of Physics (1969-72)
 
Professcr of Physics (1972- )
 
California Polytechnic Uni"/erslty, San Luis Obispo. CA
 
e.	 Visiting Professor of Fhysics
 
University of Gron~gen. The Netherlands (1972. 1980)
 
f.	 Legislative Assistant and Science Advisor to Senator John Glenn 
U.S. S~nate (1975-77) 
g.	 Special Assistant to Under 3ecretary ai"State Lucy Benson and 
Deputy-Under Secretary Joseph Nye, U.S. Department of State (1977-1979) 
h.	 Visiting Scientist. Mass. Instit. of Te~hnology (1983-4) 
J.	 EXpertenc~ with Nuc1ea= Non-~oI~feration ~~tters 
a.	 U.S. Senatel After the deto~~tlon by India of a nuclear device 
in 1974, the Co~ittee on Covernmen·~ Affa1=s of tr~ U.S, Senate 
held extensive hearings on the "Export Reorga~..1za.t1on Act of 1975" 
~h1ch ~ealt with nuclear nonproliferation. It was my job to be 
the full-time 'Jta!'fperson to the Ad-hoc Cha.~rran of t.."le Cor.:ll\1ttee, 
Senator ~ler.~, on hearings and mark-up of the act. I was Se~Ator 
Glenn's main advisor on nuclear non-proliferation ~~tters. 
b.	 Depart~ent of State I In 1977. I was appointed as one o~ two 
1pecial Assistant on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation to 
Under-Secretary Benson and Deputy-Under Sec::'etary Nye. Dr. Uye 
had the lead role for nuclear non-proliferation in the Exe:::'.itive 
~ch and ate the London Nuclear Supplier Negotiations. 
During this time, I was inti~~tcly involved with the dra!tlng ar~ 
passage 0: t.."le ~ucleax Non-Proliferation Act.of 1978, particlpat~ng 
in the Department of Eher~'s ~o~-proliferation Al~ernative Syster-s 
Assessment Program (NASAr), ani dealing as a representative of the 
Under Secretary with officials of other nations' nuclear pr~graws. 
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In adli1t1on, I wa" the lead State DePll.rtJ:lllDt delegate to 
Vorldng Croup e (Advanced FuBl Cycle and Reactor Cor.cepts) 
or the Inte~natlorAl Fuel Cycle £Valuatlo~ (rNF~) which 
tIUI held at the Intcr:'JaUor.al Ato=lc Energ'f Agency (UEA) 
1n Vienna 9u't:group C o! this 'Jerking Group had as its sale 
task the assessnent at 1118t.hOO5 of reducln@; prol1ferat!.on rlsk:t 
.s~oclated with research reactors. OOS member of interagency
SUbgroup on Nuclear Exports (SNEC). 
4.	 PublicaHoM 
a.	 Nuclear Non-ProlU'e!"3.tionl 
1.	 "Nonprol1feratlon and Alternative Nuclear Technologl~5".
 
Technoloex Sevlew 81, se (Dace.ber 1978).
 
11.	 "Schnee and 50c~l!ltJ Te~t" ~uclear NOl':(r.:ll1fera. Ucn".
 
Ane:""!c:m JI;'\:!"!lal cf PI';1.·<;~cs tie. 112 (1geO)
 
1~1.	 prlr,e au~or/e<:!.ltor of t~e ?resl:iential Report to the Congress 
on the env1ron~ental impacts associated with nuclear exports abroad (1980) 
lv.	 co-author/editor er the Sup~leoent ~~c1ear Re~earch and Develc)~ent 
Export Act1v1t~es tl:i ~OA 15hZ (U.9. liuclur EXport. Activities • 
'eptnber 1979• 
.b. Solid Slate and Nuclear Phy!!iCSI
 
20 &rtlc1eSI four book chapters, one book
 
c.	 Energy Technology &nd Policy. 
15 articles. co-edited 2 books 
